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This thesis examines whether the Spanish airline Volotea follows a business model di↵erent
from those defined in the literature, by using a comparative assessment of parameters.
In the first place, the literature review is presented to provide some context to the subject
of research. This includes both an explanation of what a business model is and what it is useful
for; as well as the main commercial aviation business models.
Then, the choice of business models considered relevant to the comparison is justified.
Additionally, the airlines chosen to represent each of these business models and the parameters
used to categorize or measure the characteristics of each airline are examined.
The results include the comparison of the airlines as the di↵erent parameters are analysed.
These suggest that Volotea’s operations are indeed substantially di↵erent. Its search of eco-
nomies of scope in the operation of a significant amount of low-demand routes, rather than the
focus in high tra c markets, provides it a name found in the field of business model studies:
the Long Tail business model in aviation.
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1.1 Scope and Approach
After reviewing the existing literature with the purpose of coming up with a theme for the
present research thesis, it became evident that there was a gap between recent innovation in
the reality of the airline business and the existing research literature.
The underlying topic of this thesis therefore rose as a need to characterise the actual
diversity of business models in the airline industry, which, far from the Di↵erentiation–Cost
Leadership dualism that traditionally characterized the industry, is now full of a diversity of
business models that have not yet been properly identified.
Within the variety of airlines following these diversity of business models is Volotea. Volotea
is a Spanish airline that was founded in 2012 by Carlos Mun˜oz and La´zaro Ros, who founded
Vueling aswell. In its website, the airline states that it connects small and medium sized
European cities with non-stop direct flights at very competitive prices. Adding, “We want you
to spend more time at your destination and less time on the plane”. And claim to cater for the
individual instead of following the crowd.
This is actually what stands out from the airline’s operations the most: although it has
been repeatedly referred to as a Low-Cost airline, Volotea literally does not follow the crowd.
The airline o↵ers budget-friendly prices and flies to 89 destinations but o↵er however a low
amount of flights per week.
Volotea therefore also contains Regional Carrier tinges, as it operates small and mid-sized
cities, but it does so with medium-sized airliners. However, it stands out too, that the airline
not just flies within a fixed region, but has its operations spread all over Europe.
In short, the initial hypothesis of the present thesis is that Volotea does not strictly following
any of the business models described in the literature.
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Given this premise, the purpose of this paper sets to study whether it can be considered
that Volotea follows a new business model that has not yet been described in the Literature.
This will be done by comparing it with the existing business models and analysing whether
there is a substantial di↵erence between its parameters as a whole, that leaves the airline at a
di↵erent, new category.
The paper will be structured as follows. In the first place, the term business model will
be defined and di↵erentiated from that of strategy. It is essential to clarify the concept of
business model, as the purpose of this paper is not just to classify a given airline into a business
model type, but to identify this business model as a potentially powerful tool. Innovation in the
business structure of a company – an airline in this case – can be a game changer in catapulting
it, without necessarily counting on new technology.
Next, the concept of business model will be put into context within the field of the airline
industry: a background on existing airline business models will be given. These include the
Full-Service Carrier (FSC); the Low-Cost Carrier (LCC), together with its long-range variant
and the concept of Hybrids; and the di↵erent types of Regional Carriers - the Feeder type and
the Bounded Regional.
The chapter that follows will describe the methodology to be followed to find an answer to
the research question. As already stated, this will be done by comparing the staging of Volotea
with that of other airlines which belong to other defined business models.
To do so, the characteristic parameters of an airline’s operation will be compared through-
out all airlines observed. Such parameters will be defined in this chapter as well as the conditions
under which the data required for the studies is collected. Secondly, the business models to
which Volotea will be compared will be argued. As hinted already, these will be the short-haul
and regional strategies – all others will be excluded as the comparison has the purpose to see
if Volotea could be potentially following any of these business models. Lastly, the archetype
airlines, set as an example of the chosen business models, will be presented. This choice will
be justified, as they will be selected taking account certain constraints, among which is data
availability.
Chapter number 4 will consist of the results of the analysis of indicators. The methodology
will be implemented, obtaining a structured comparison of parameters of Volotea with four other
di↵erent airlines. It will contain, whenever possible, numbers which sustain the theory found
on the airlines visited. To avoid repetition, an initial analysis of Volotea itself will be conducted
and then referred to at every section whenever needed.
Lastly, Chapter 5 will contain an overview of the results obtained in Chapter 4. Conclusions
will be drawn from the analysis and the question of whether it can be considered that Volotea




All in all, the question of this research study is: Can the business model that Volotea follows be
considered as a new business model?
If this question proves positive, what di↵erentiates Volotea from already existing business
models? And what characterises this business model?
Provided that these questions have not been formulated in any previously consulted studies,
the present paper will try to explore the answers, to the extent that it is possible. The lack
of studies may be due to the assumption that low-tra c routes with an homogeneous route
may not have, a priori, the potential of being highly profitable, as they can never achieve the
economies of scale obtained by the bigger players in the market. However, these are overseeing






This section will examine the literature available in order to reveal the theoretical framework on
which this paper stands. It will recap, with a scientific background and in a structured manner,
the concepts reviewed prior to the forming of this thesis and on which such thesis stands.
As previewed in the introduction, this literature review will start defining the concepts
of strategy and business model. Then, the existing airline business models will be portrayed,
describing a set of characteristic parameters in a specific sequence, in order give more structure
to the content. Such parameters are the di↵erentiation key of the business model, its target
customer, any class distinctions, its revenue generation, type of network, type of fleet, type
of route operation and possible alliances between airlines. To establish a further connection
between theory and practice, examples of airlines – European and non-European – and any other
interesting facts that may be useful to understand the literature will be also reviewed.
2.1 Business Model And Strategy
The concepts of business model and business strategy are key in the operation of a company and
are not to be confused. On the one hand, a business model is a method which is systematically
implemented to generate revenue and maintain a profitable company. On the other hand, a
business strategy is a description of the means to achieve the core objective of such a company
[13] [14].
In this paper, the business model is the concept of interest. This concept has been receiving
growing attention since the mid-nineties, especially among managers and consultants, and has
been seen as necessary for a company to become successful[15].
New business models explain the success of a great number of internationally well-known
companies. These successes go beyond companies’ limits: producing a generation of new mar-
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kets [16], leading to the creation of new industries [17], or both. Business model innovation
is believed to be able to do this because, in fact, this has already happened in some markets
and industries. “Business model innovations have reshaped entire industries and redistributed
billions of dollars of value” [18].
Expectations are even greater: “[...] a company has at least as much value to gain from
developing an innovative new business model as from developing an innovative new technology”
[19]. The business model then becomes an essential part of the strategy followed by the company
in order to reach sustainable competitive advantage [20] and the ability to generate new business
models, to choose the best ones and implement them in a new or old organization, become a
real dynamic capability [21].
Some limitations have arisen due to the concept’s recent development, with the lack of a
commonly accepted definition being one of them, meaning there is still no common position
about the concept in academic circles. In fact, some academics seem reluctant to acknowledge
the term [22].
Magretta [23] described business models as ‘stories that explain how enterprises work’, and
added,
a good business model answers Peter Drucker’s age-old questions: Who is the customer?
And What does the customer value? It also answers the fundamental questions every manager
must ask: How do we make money in this business? What is the underlying economic logic that
explains how we can deliver value to customer at an appropriate cost? [23]
Similar definitions proliferate among other authors [19][21][24][25].
A second category of definitions describes the concept by listing its components. Oster-
walder and Pigneur’s ontology split the business model into nine elements or blocks: value
proposition, customer segments, channels, customer relationships, key resources, key activities,
key partners, revenue streams and cost structure [26]. Its graphic representation is known as
the Business Model Canvas (Figure 2.1). Akin to this, several other definitions have included
a similar set of components [18][27].
Nevertheless, academics find the true potential of this concept in the discovery and imple-
mentation of new business models, namely in business model innovation. But, what is business
model innovation? [18][19] When is a business model new?
By business model innovation, some authors mean any change in a business model com-
ponent [28][29]. This paper considers this is an overly broad conception of business model
innovation, which would include all kinds of innovation, from technological advances to any
change in marketing [30].
Lindgardt et al.[27] suggested a narrower definition of business model innovation: ‘Innov-
6
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Figure 2.1: Business Model Canvas [1]
ation becomes business model innovation when two or more elements of a business model are
reinvented to deliver value in a new way.’ This definition implies more disruptive innovation,
in the meaning highlighted by Christensen [31], and can lead to greater changes in an overall
business model [30].
The interest of this paper in changes that can create new markets and reshape industries,
makes the narrow definition of Lindgardt et al. a particularly useful one. Along these lines,
other academics [32] viewed business model innovation as “a process that deliberately changes
the core elements of a firm and its business logic” [30].
Having pointed out the importance of the adoption of new business models as a means of
searching for new ways to operate an airline in the market and deliver value to customers [33],
it is noteworthy that some authors [34] propose that the business model is not a strategy as
proposed by Shafer et al. [35], but a tool for analysis and reporting of organizational strategies,
contributing to the understanding, analysis and communication of possibilities related to defined
projects [34].
Here lies, therefore, the importance to identify new business models and examine their
contribution on innovation and value creation of the airline business.
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2.2 Existing Airline Business Models
2.2.1 Full-Service Carrier
The Full-Service Carrier (FSC) business model, known to follow the generic di↵erentiation
strategy, is the heir of Flag Carriers. The bilateral agreements of aerial services established in
the twentieth century fixed the number of airports from which flights could operate between
two countries. These Air Service Agreements (ASA) also limited the number of air transport
companies that could operate these flights internationally, usually to the Flag Carriers of both
countries. Once these companies endured privatisation, most of them transformed into what
are known as FSCs today [2]. These therefore maintain many of the commodities that these
national carriers o↵ered.
FSCs o↵er di↵erent class fares, each of which provides a service designed for every budget
type. However, compared to other business models – which will be later described –, which
are dependent on the range or length of flight. These services should meet the customers’
expectations and translate to what the customer believes is a fair price in order to be able to
compete with the lower prices provided by competitors. This is what the di↵erentiation strategy
consists of: o↵ering a unique product – which, inevitably, comes with a price premium.
Before, “unique o↵ering” could simply mean generalised luxury. Today, not everything
works. As consumer trends change, the unique o↵ering has to adapt to each traveler profile’s
needs and ease its commute from A to B, bringing more value to his or her in-flight experience.
This unique o↵ering may come in the form of a service – even for a short flight, food may be
provided, as well as drinks or a magazine –, the design of the plane itself (low seat-density), the
flexibility of their fare o↵ers and, in broader terms, the way the customers perceive the brand’s
image. This perception of uniqueness is what brings value to the customer – “quality” and
“performance” alone are not su cient. In fact, the latter are imperative in the airline industry,
together with safety and security, which does not leave much space for cutting costs and ticket
prices [36].
All in all, airlines which choose to implement this business model have to ask themselves
constantly how defensible or stable the di↵erentiation is, as well as how e↵ective are the entry
barriers.
The target customers in this business model – this is, the customers towards who their
strategy is directed – are those who can a↵ord to pay more and who admit the extra price is
justified for the additional features they receive.
In most cases, it is the frequent or business travelers the ones who priorize commodity
over ticket price. This customer type actually has especially-designed fares which o↵er high
flexibility in booking and changing flights as well as more seat comfort. This is the Business or
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Executive Class [36] and it is a core part of the FSC’s strategy and business model.
Another class for which FSCs are known for is the so-called first class. This class does
resemble a luxurious experience – among other services, it includes the most comfortable seats
and all-you-can-eat meals and drinks – and is usually the most expensive fare. This class is
normally just available in long-haul flights.
Economy class, on the other hand, is the cheapest class FSCs o↵er -– although it is normally
more expensive than the one-class-fits-all fare of a LCC. Basic services are still o↵ered, though,
unlike in a LCC – these range from a small snack and drink to a magazine. Seat spaces are
the narrowest here and there is less legroom compared to higher classes. This option is often
purchased by leisure travelers. Many FSCs also o↵er an upgrade to premium economy, which
may contain slightly more comfortable seating – with more legroom and wider space.
Classes are usually physically partitioned and there is a clear di↵erentiation between one
another in bigger aircraft, particularly for international flights.
In any case, it has to be ensured that the additional benefit is directly proportional to the
customer satisfaction — whichever type of customer it is referred to –, for the revenue model
to work.
Something that started o↵ as characteristic of FSCs is the frequent-flyer program. These
work with points to reward loyalty and therefore keep the customer engaged. Points may o↵er
benefits such as cheaper flights or discounts on products o↵ered by the airline itself or by partner
companies. This means that they enable the airline to maintain its presence in the customer’s
life, not just in-flight, but also during the time in between flights.
When it comes to revenue generation, counterintuitively, a price premium may lead to a
cost disadvantage. This is mainly due to a lower volume in sales. Therefore, this model of
revenue generation pursues to cover costs with the sale of economy class tickets and produce
earnings with business- and first-class tickets[36].
Another distinctive feature about FSCs is their network: the Hub and Spoke system.
Returning to the historical-background narrative of FSCs, in order to give international service
to the rest of airports of the country, and conditioned by the regulatory limitations, Flag Carriers
established domestic routes that linked this international exit point with the rest of national
destinations. This international airport acted then as concentrator (Hub) and connected the
rest of national destinations with radial routes (Spokes), configuring a network now known as
Hub and Spoke (H&S) [2].
Today, the FSC’s hub would be a specific airport, typically the main airport of its national
country’s capital city. The operation from this point is simple: all flights have either origin or
destination in this hub. The FSC is often partnered with a Regional Feeder, which operates
the lower-tra c routes from and to the hub. In this way, all smaller groups of passengers from
9
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Figure 2.2: Hub and Spoke Network [2]
smaller cities concentrate in the bigger city, summing up to a critical mass enough to fill up a
bigger aircraft. This is how economies of scale are achieved. Many airlines, though, have more
than just one hub – both still typically in large cities of the country of the FSCs. This dynamic
can be seen in Figure 2.2 [37].
Advantages of a H&S network are that they allow for an e cient use of scarce transporta-
tion resources and increase the market coverage: with a reduced number of routes, it connects
places with less original volume through the aviation network and simplify planning and pro-
vision of aircraft, personnel and spare parts. It also reduces costs by using larger aircraft and
can simplify the planning of regular maintenance.[36]
On the other hand, this type of network is unattractive to passengers, as it consists of
multiple stopovers. It also creates congestion and delays at hub airports, therefore requiring
high performance of the infrastructure at peak times. The system has also high complexity and
is susceptible to interference. [36]
Given the wide range of connections that may be performed by a Hub-and-Spoke network,
there is a need for availability of an adaptable and flexible fleet. This therefore demands for an
heterogeneous fleet that allows to plan for all sorts of flights, including long- and short-range
and high- and low-capacity aircraft, although FSCs have an increasing focus on long-range
operations. [36]
A final characteristic of a FSC is that most of them belong to an alliance constituted by
other FSCs around the world. Strong alliances allow them to cooperate in many ways: fly in
shared code and partner up for unplanned maintenance or operational events. Examples are
the Star Alliance, Oneworld or SkyTeam. [36]
The biggest FSC in Europe is Lufthansa – with its main hub in Frankfurt and its second
one in Munich and it belongs to the Star Alliance which consists of 26 airlines worldwide.
Other FSCs are KLM, Air France and Iberia. Another example outside Europe would be Delta
Airlines, with its hub in Atlanta in the US, belonging to the SkyTeam Alliance with 20 partners
worldwide.
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2.2.2 Charter Carrier
A Charter Carrier operates on the basis of rented or leased flights. They are mostly known for
being part of a holiday package. This is, a tour operator will lease a flight and combine the
costs together with other elements of a holiday, such as hotels and transfers, and sell the whole
thing as a package to the customer. Sometimes they can work with FSCs too [37][36].
This can be convenient, as these trips are usually acquired by a big group of people –
which makes up for the renting of the aircraft – and avoids stopovers to reach the final destin-
ation.
The majority of the customers of a Charter airline are, then, found in the touristic market.
Nevertheless, there are other possible uses of Charter Carriers alongside tour operators: they
are also rented for private use – for instance, a football club may rent an aircraft of this type to
take the whole team to a match destination. All in all, they are operated on an ad-hoc basis,
this is, when required. For this reason, they fit into the category of non-regular flights.
These flights do not normally o↵er as many commodities as one would expect in a scheduled
flight. They have just one class and they normally take o↵ from tertiary airports at o↵-peak
hours [37].
There are a few key factors that enable this strategy to work: the reduced operative
costs, as they use big aircraft that operate at an almost full capacity – multi-use personnel
to simplify operations and reduced costs of commercialization, as flights are mainly o↵ered by
touristic agencies. Costs are then covered by the sale of tickets and earnings come from ancillary
revenues [37][36].
Their fleet is homogeneous and sometimes additional aircraft are leased. It could be con-
sidered, then, that these carriers operate a Point to Point network, although it rather depends
on the customer’s needs and it can be either short-, mid- or long-range [36].
Known Charter airlines in Europe are TUi or Condor. An example outside Europe would
be Pegasus Airlines, in Turkey.
These carriers were very popular in the 1990s, but seem to be in decadence since the air
travel catapulted with the raising of the LCCs. However, there seems to be a reformulation
of the concept with relatively new airlines such as Evelop, Plus Ultra or Wamos Air. The
idea is not quite the same: these are not exactly Charter as in unscheduled and non-regular.
Instead, they fly to specific holiday destinations. For instance, from Madrid to South America,
Portugal or the Balearic Islands in a seasonal manner and do direct flights which to holiday
destinations.
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2.2.3 Low-Cost Carrier
The Low-Cost Carrier (LCC), known to follow the general cost-leadership strategy, set with
its raise a before-and-after in air travel. It enabled people with lower income to access what
was earlier understood as a luxury service and has ever since increased the utilisation of means
of air transportation throughout the entire world. Consequently, it promoted tourism to the
extreme.
This, though, came with a limited o↵er of in-flight services, which transformed an airplane
trip to what it actually is: just a means of transport that carries passengers from A to B – as a
car or a bus does. For many, the flight has stopped being part of the whole travelling experience
and is just what one has to deal with in order to arrive the actual experience – especially where
distances are insignificant, as it is in Europe.
To better understand the evolution of a LCC, it is important to track it back to the world’s
biggest LCC: Southwest. It was in fact not the first airline to implement this business model –
it copied the strategy of Pacific Southwest Airlines, but took it to the limit. The airline was so
successful in disrupting US airfares that the economic term “Southwest E↵ect” was created in
the late 1990s as their entry into any route would completely a↵ect its dynamics. Such e↵ect
occurred in three stages: it first increased supply and o↵ered lower prices on that route. This
led airlines that already operated such routes to lower their fares to be able to compete; then
sales for all airlines rose. As a consequence, lower prices would increase the overall demand for
air travel and, at the end of the day, carriers who had lowered their fares view a compensation
as they had improved their load factor [38].
This model was copied in Europe almost 20 years later by Ryanair and others. Ryanair also
completely reshaped the European markets and there is currently a Ryanair flight departing
every 45 seconds. LCCs now dictate prices in most markets and is one of the engines of their
constant growth [39].
The target customer in this business model is, for the most part, a frequent traveler on a
budget or a holiday traveler.
One of the basic principles of an LCC would be that it has only one class that fits all. This
class consists of narrow seats with short legroom. Any extra upgrade or “frill” is limited and
has to be payed for [37].
In LCCs, fixed costs are covered by the tickets themselves and any supplementary earnings
are generated by ancillary revenues. Ancillary revenues mean not just the food or drinks – LCCs
are always creating side-businesses that complement their main business. Examples of these
are rental car companies, but now they also have an o↵ering of accommodation and experiences
as well as sale of additional products and o↵-flight services.
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The coverage of fixed costs is possible due to the fierce reduction of all costs, which enables
plane ticket prices to be lower and results in the selling out of entire flights. This is, although
the tickets are a reduced price, the fact that all seats are sold out, makes it possible to cover
expenses.
This dynamic also benefits the airline as it secures a huge volume of sales and the full
capacity of the airline is fully covered. It triggers rapid buying in customers, who fear prices
will go up or that the plane trip will be sold out when they decide to purchase the ticket.
In comparison to an FSC, the seat density in a given aircraft model is higher in a LCC.
This is because the cabin is utilized to achieve a maximum number of seats – this is also mainly
the reason why there is less legspace: it enables the fitting of one or two more rows of seats,
maybe also with a reorganization of toilets or cutting back the number of toilets to the strictly
legal. No di↵erentiation of class also enables a higher utilisation of space as there is no need
for physical divisions [37].
Another fact that enables cost reduction of the LCCs is that tickets are sold by direct
integration [37]. Ryanair was a pioneer in Europe with what now seems normal – buying the
tickets o↵ the internet. As well as online sales, though, they have a call center available to
make ticket reservations. By completely eliminating intermediaries – agents and GDS – they
significantly reduced costs and agilised the process. This means of sales is now widely used by
FSCs too [37].
One more strategy related to ticket sales is the overbooking of flights. Most airlines do
this, as, statistically, a certain number of people who buy the ticket do not make it to the flight.
That is why it turns out to be more profitable to carry a full aircraft and pay compensations if
needed, rather than having a few empty seats per flight.
Another means by which costs are minimized in LCCs is making use of secondary airports.
These are cheaper to operate in as they are less frequented, have more slots available and are
away from the monopoly that the Flag Carrier may influence [37].
Other areas in which the operating costs of the LCC may be reduced are the handling at
the airport and the services for the passengers – for instance, the passenger boarding bridge
or performing boarding right next to the terminal. These provide a more comfortable service
to passengers but represent higher costs for the airline – and consequently for the flight tickets
[37].
The high utilization of the aircraft and lower time on ground also significantly reduce
costs. LCCs work hard on achieving quick boarding and deboarding of passengers and e cient
handling in order to be the minimum waiting time on land. That is why typically these fleets
have to be checked on a more regular basis, as they have more flight hours in less time thanks
to reduced turn-around times [37].
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Figure 2.3: Point to Point Network [2]
Low operational costs are sought with employer policies too, with minimum sta ng outside
the cabin and with temporary contracts. This translates into less fixed costs in sta↵ and also
in o ce spaces.[37]
When it comes to network operation, LCCs use the Point-to-Point transit, seen in Figure
2.3, which has completely di↵erent approach to that used by FSCs. No hubs, no transfer flights
– this network eliminates the need for connection flights and therefore reduces travel time.
These are usually more convenient for the passenger. There is also less risk of baggage loss
and less chance of accumulation of delayed flights (domino e↵ect). Total fuel and pollution per
passenger are lower too.
This network operation makes sense with cheap flights, as they always load up. Because
of this, frequencies may be lower than in a typical Hub-and-Spoke network. In the case that
a customer would want a connecting flight to some other destination, he or she would have
to book it separately, as LCCs do not sell these flights as a pack. This also simplifies fare
structures.
LCCs operate short- to mid-range routes. Attempts to implement the LCC business model
in longer routes are being taken, as set out below, but this limits cost reduction in many
ways.
LCC fleets are homogeneous: frequently composed by one single type of aircraft or, at
most, aircraft from the same family. This allows for lower expenses, as economies of scale are
achieved. Costs on maintenance go down, as well as costs in mechanics’ and pilots’ training and
inventory of stocked parts for maintenance. It also allows for a better deals when negotiating
prices with manufacturers for aircraft purchase orders [37].
Unlike FSCs, LCCs are not usually part of any alliances.
All in all, LCCs are characterised by being especially careful about their spending and make
the most out of every cent. This policy results e↵ective when applied in all areas and maintain
a consistent alignment with the marketing and o↵ering of their products and services.
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It can be argued that this strategy is based on innovation: especially during the last years,
LCCs have been transforming the status quo and reworked it so that it was acceptable to pay
extra for what had been for years a basic, changing the rules of the game.
Contrary to the process of product dynamics in which a potential product, initially con-
sidered a luxury, transforms into a basic benefit, Ryanair did the opposite. What was considered
basic benefit was turned to a luxury. [40]
In the first years of Ryanair, for instance, passengers would have to pay if they did not do
the check-in in advance and bring the ticket printed out by themselves. Examples of this are
also present with seating system: the normal service provided by an airline at the time gave the
possibility to choose a seat at the time of the purchase; Ryanair started providing a random
seat to the customer and later on even made the passenger pay in order to be able to choose
it. Nowadays, there is even di↵erent quotations, depending on where the seat is located – more
leg space meaning extra money. These seats are not even assigned directly to a passenger who
does a late check-in, forcing the passenger to do an on-site check-in – hence arriving earlier to
the airport – or pay for the extra frill. Another recent change in Ryanair which was considered
a “basic” is their change in having to pay for a carry-on. Before the spreading of LCCs, even
a checked bag was included with the ticket.
All this assures that people will pay for it, as it is a need and not an “extra”. The perception
of the initial price as very low (as the first impression for the passenger), together with the
already-present perception of the airline as Low-Cost continues to promote the purchase.
Typical examples of LCCs have been named already: Ryanair, which operates exclusively
in Europe and Southwest, which operates exclusively in the US.
The LCC concept has been so successful that di↵erent ways of exploiting it, beyond the
original model, have been sought, such as the following.
Long-Haul Low-Cost Carrier
A controversial variation of the LCC would be the Long-Haul Low Cost. Its economic viability
has been questioned many times as every company which has ventured into implementing this
business model, ends up surviving thanks to its short-haul alternative brand. And all together,
few airlines have made true Long-Haul Low-Cost work in a sustainable way, despite some of
them achieving sporadic profitability.
Provided that in long-haul, fuel represents a large portion of the cost of flight, there is
little to no place to cut down on costs. The fixed costs are therefore a big percentage of an
FSC’s international flight ticket. Only some airport handling or catering costs may vary with
the amount of passengers [41][42][43].
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Also, in flights of these characteristics, it is more di cult to incite people to purchase
impulsively just for the sake of a short vacation, as longer flights are normally worthwhile when
spending a longer time at the destination.
This carrier type is not intended for the business traveller and is rather directed at the
budget leisure traveller. Business class is a key part of the revenues generated by a typical
FSC’s long-haul flight, so not reaching these customers wastes a big part of their potential
market.
Some airlines that have attempted this model are Norwegian in Europe and Jetstar in
Australia. [36]
To sum up, this sector remains in its infancy. With further development, these airlines
may become sustainable, but, for the moment, these are just a ”lower cost” rather than truly
low cost option.
The Hybrid Carrier
Over the recent years, many airlines have started to follow hybridized business models. Most,
though, started implementing the LCC business model, but gradually evolved into adapting
characteristics from FSCs too. It is now therefore common to find that the frontiers between
LCCs and FSCs are starting to blur. “Hybrid” is a characteristic that can adopt variable values
– an airline can be more or less hybridized, and what is more, in di↵erent ways and according
to di↵erent parameters [44].
Most hybridisations are looking to o↵er a unique value-adding service to passengers - as the
key to di↵erentiation - and to secure a competitive advantage. As it is happening today in all
other industries, the airline industry is leaving behind “old-fashioned” models, which presented
their services as a “favour” to the customer, and shifting the focus to what customers – of all
kinds – demand.
As many hybrid models did not start o↵ as hybrids, questions arise regarding whether these
strategies can be implemented from the beginning or if they are sustainable during prolonged
periods of time, as airlines especially focus on the outcome of its strategy on the long-term.
The success of those that work today may simply be, then, isolated events.
There is a large number of carriers considered as LCCs that have in fact evolved into
hybrids [33] from initially following this business model. What a hybrid is like, though, cannot
be defined, as it is a middle-point position in the spectrum between FSC and LCC – this is
many initial LCCs have moved towards the FSC end of the spectrum [3].
Examples of these would be JetBlue or Air Berlin [3]. To achieve a better understanding
of what a hybrid’s business model looks like, it is best to show the results of Corbo’s study on
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the mentioned companies in Figure 2.4.
(a) Air Berlin’s business model alignment curve
(b) JetBlue’s business model alignment curve
Figure 2.4: Results in L. Corbo’s study [3]
A hybrid airline, therefore, combines features from a FSC and a LCC into a unique business
model. It takes advantage of its individual operational capabilities to di↵erentiate itself in terms
of pricing, product, fleet, network design and overall e ciency. Within the two mainstream
business models, there is a myriad of airlines utilising the best of each model [3].
The hybridization in this case is therefore presented per se as a business model strategy
that aims to achieve di↵erentiation.
2.2.4 Regional Carrier
A regional airline is defined as an airline that operates regional aircraft and provides “passenger
air service to communities without su cient demand to attract mainline service” [45].
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According to this definition, what is particular about this business model is that it covers
the demand of communities that are not big enough to draw the attention of a LCC or FSC
with frequent and regular service.
The target customer of such carrier is, then, a person who would otherwise have to make
use of a di↵erent means of transport to get to a main airport, either for work or for pleasure,
and most probably would have to spend time on stopovers, with no other option [36].
Regional Carriers typically fly low-tra c and short-range routes. Fleets are usually com-
posed by homogeneous, single-class aircraft, which may be either regional jet aircraft or turbop-
rops. The key, in any case, is that they have to balance out frequencies in order to fill up the
aircraft and still attend demand hours. Their earnings come from ancillary revenues, having
covered costs with the ticket sale of the economy class [36].
The network type would be Point to Point, however, this is subject to particularities as
will be seen in the following subsections. The same applies to their alliances.
Regional Carriers can take two forms, according to the Literature: Feeder airlines, a liated
to a major airline; and independent airlines, which provide service to small, isolated regions
[45].
Feeder Carrier
Feeder Carriers are basically in charge of “feeding” an FSC with passengers, as hinted when
defining FSCs. They are considered to follow a regional business model due to the fact that they
fly short-range routes on aircraft with a lower capacity. They pick up passengers from smaller
cities and “collect” them in the hub so that the FSC then flies them all in a bigger aircraft to
another location. For this reason, the leg covered by Feeders is within a H&S network.
FSC and Feeder operate together as, in a way, they “need” each other to survive. On the
one hand, partnering with a bigger airline secures the regional airlines enough passengers and
survival. On the other hand, the routes that the Feeder flies would imply more di culties if it
was to be covered by the FSC, as it would demand di↵erent fleet specifications and a general
di↵erent business approach. It is very useful, therefore, that the Feeder operates these flights
for them as a separate business unit. The customers that come in and from the hub making
use of the Feeder are an indispensable part of their customers and represent a high percentage
of the passengers needed to fill up a bigger aircraft - key of the functioning of a Hub-and-Spoke
network.
Often, these flights will be advertised by the FSC itself as part of a connecting flight. The
way to recognise the Feeder airline will be stated in the ticket as ”Operated by [name of the
Feeder] ”.
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Examples in Europe are Lufthansa City Line, as the Feeder airline to Lufthansa Passage,
or Air Nostrum as the Feeder airline to Iberia. Outside of Europe there is, for instance, Japan
Air Commuter, a liated to Japan Air and the Japanese State [36].
Some of the Literature also talks about the “Dual-Brand Strategy”, as it is actually two
completely separate businesses, with di↵erent business models, that need and complement each
other and work well together [36].
Geographically-Bounded Regional Carrier
This type of regional is described as “operating as an independent airline under their own
brand, mostly providing service to small and isolated towns, for whom the airline is the only
reasonable link to a larger town” [45].
The distinctive feature of this airline type is, then, that it connects “isolated towns”. A
clear example would be the aerial connection of islands within an archipelago. Such Regional
Carrier would have the objective of connecting islands with one another first, then of connecting
these with the mainland.
Again, as this demand is small and so localized, it needs a fleet of low-capacity, short-range
aircraft, which operate the Point-to-Point routes at studied frequencies. Such routes would be
too specific for a traditional airline to operate and take benefit from, as the characteristics of
the route would be not fitting to their fleet. Demand would not be enough to attract their
attention either, them being able to make more substantial and secure profit in routes that are
more fitting to their business model.
The implementation of this business model is found in airlines all over the world. The
islands of Hawaii, for instance, have an airline that connects the airlines with each other and
with the mainland called Mokuele. An example in Europe may be the airline Binter that
operates flights in the Canary Islands.
Binter also operates mainly inter-insular flights and has expanded its reach to Cabo Verde,
the Macaronesia and West Africa, as well as flying to the Spanish mainland and the Balearic
Islands. In fact, as happens with Feeder airlines, Binter has settled with Iberia the deal for
which it may partly operate inter-insular flights that are part of a connecting flight to the
Peninsula for a major commodity of passengers [46].
Binter has absorbed other airlines that used to operate this same business model in the
area and actually has a “Feeder” itself, and sells tickets with the label “operated by Canarias
Airlines”. This could be classified as a regional within a regional. It could also be considered
as micro-FSC within its small environment, a FSC at a local level [46].
The existence of competition, then, denotes that this business is not just intended for
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tourism, but rather for commuters or visiting friends and relatives. As it is a very specific
situation which limited resources to get from one place to another, there is a clear need for this
sort of transport and there is a clear niche that requires it and is willing to pay for it.
On a side note, after exploring the websites of these airlines, it becomes apparent that
these are not one hundred per cent “attractive”. Although this may not be necessary for the
correct operation of an airplane, it is quite important nowadays to have a good website that
may attract the customer. This may show, once again, that it attends a need, rather than try
to create it [46].
Given the nature of these Regional airlines, it is especially important when applying their
business models to consider the possible competition with other means of transport – the ones
that are already there and have been traditionally used to connect these destinations. In the
case of the Feeder it would be the train or car, and in the case of a Geographically-Bounded




This chapter describes the method that will be followed to gather the necessary information to
answer the question of whether Volotea follows an alternative business model. The approach
taken is to compare Volotea with an archetypal airline of each of the currently existing models.
Then, the resulting data will be compared to that of Volotea. As the airlines chosen will typify
the business models described in the theory, the comparison of parameters will be potentially
able to identify substantial di↵erences, if any, in the operations carried out by Volotea.
The following sections will define the parameters chosen for the comparison and justify why
these are good indicators; as well as which business models are suitable for the comparison, as
not all of the explained in the Literature are relevant to the study. Lastly, provided that the
study is based around the practical implementation of a business model by an airline – namely,
Volotea –, this airline will have to be compared to other airlines, not just the theoretical basis
of the business models presented in the Literature Research. Therefore, it will also be justified
here, which airlines are chosen to do the comparison, each of which will follow one of the
business models chosen. Finally, the structure in which the final comparison of parameters will
take place will also be specified.
3.1 Justification of the Parameters of Choice
The following parameters will allow to establish a comparison between the characteristics of
each business model. Each airline will be analysed according to these parameters and the results
will be then compared to those of Volotea.
1 Attended Destinations
– Target Market: this parameter will include comments on the type of customer that
the airline targets, as well as their distribution strategies and their reach. Besides
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this, it will be identified whether their service is o↵ered to any particular closed
niche, in terms of market segmentation or geography.
– Airline’s Destinations: this parameter will give an overview of the amount of
destinations and countries that the company operates as of February 2020. It will
also show on a map such destinations and extract superficial conclusions of any
characteristics that may stand out strictly from taking a look at the map.
– Airports Operated: this parameter will show, whenever possible, which percentage
of the passengers carried by the airline are flown to a certain airport size (total
passengers – outbound and inbound from each airport). This will act as a measure
to determine the type of airport that each airline flies most of its passengers to.
This would clarify an important point of their business model, as it can determine a
di↵erence in the niche of customers that each airline directs its service to.
Given that passenger figures per operation are only available at the AENA Statistics
portal [5], and these only record movements from and to Spanish airports, this study
is only conducted only on a number of Spanish airports. The data used will be that
for 2019.
The size of the airports will be characterised by amount of passengers that pass
through it per year. Therefore, the intervals in the x axis will represent the airport
size in terms of passenger quantities. The rule of thumb will be: the bigger the
amount of passengers, the bigger the airport.
The size ranges have been chosen after collecting all the data and detecting distinct-
ive groups. Such ranges will be the following: airports with less than one million
passengers, between one and two million, between two and ten million, between ten
and thirty million and more than thirty million passengers. In order to ease the
description of the graphs, airports with less than 1M passengers per year will be
referred to as small, those between 2M and 10M will be referred to as medium-sized
and those with more than 30M passengers per year will be referred to as big-sized
airports. 34 airports will be studied in total as those with less than one hundred
thousand passengers per year will be dismissed.
2 Attended Area
– Limits of the network: this parameter aims to define the geographical area that
the airline operates. It will also pinpoint the cities that define the furthermost ends
of its network as of February 2020.
3 Network Topology
– Airport bases: this parameter will shine a light on the number and location of
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airport hubs and primary bases of the given airline as of February 2020. This has
strategic importance and can directly define the type of network that it follows.
– Degree Centrality: this parameter aims to define the extent to which a network
is centralised around a certain airport. To do so, following [2], this paper will use
Freeman’s work applied to the study of the centrality of the network of an airline,
instead of a social network [47]. This parameter will act as indicator of the extent







c(k) is the degree of connectivity of node k
f(i,k) is a function that is equal to 1 if only if the nodes i and k are connected by
an edge and 0 in any other case
n is the number of total nodes of the network
To measure out the extent of a network’s centralisation, Freeman proposes another
expression, seen in Equation (3.2). This measure, DC, will be the parameter used




(n  1)(n  2) (3.2)
Where
DC is the degree centrality of the network
Max.c(k) is the degree of connectivity of the node which is best communicated out
of the n nodes of the network
c(i) is the degree of connectivity of node i
(n-1)(n-2) equals the maximum value that the numerator can reach and, once
divided, normalises the result, making it vary between 0 and 1
The data gathered for this study dates of February 2020 [11].
– Network Configuration: this parameter will describe the route system structure
of the airline. In principle, there are two main types of networks present in the
literature: Hub-and-Spoke network and Point-to-Point. Based on the existence of a
Hub and the Degree of Centrality of the routes, each airline will be defined as one
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or the other – or the one it is the closest to.
4 Attended Routes
– Longest and shortest routes: this parameter will show and briefly comment the
longest and shortest routes that the airline operates as of February 2020.
– Distances flown: this parameter will reflect the output of an analysis of the dis-
tances covered by each of the routes that the airline has in operation as of February
2020 [6]. The distance ranges will be divided into the following ranges: lower than
500km, between 500km and 1000km, between 1000km and 1500km, between 1500km
and 2000km, and anything larger than 2000km.
Given these results, the airline will be defined as covering short- (around 500km)
, medium- (around the 1000km to 1500km range) or long-range (around 2000km)
flights.
5 Frequencies
– Average number of weekly and daily flights per route: this parameter will
show a study of the weekly and daily frequencies of the routes operated by the airline
as of February 2020.
– Seasonality of routes: this parameter aims to determine up to which point the
airline operates seasonal flights. It will count on the study of the seasonality of the
routes of the airline in the year 2019.
6 Fleet Characteristics
– Models: this parameter will show a list of the aircraft utilised by the airline, together
with its specifications on age, range and capacity as of February 2020. Comments
will be drawn to the type of aircraft and homogeneity (according to the aircraft’s
manufacturers and aircraft familes). The fleet acts many times not only as an indic-
ator of the current operations of the airline, but also of its future intentions and it
has great strategic importance and relevant on the business model.
– Ranges: given the information on the aircraft’s range in the Models section, this
parameter will expand on the di↵erent ranges and the average range of the airline’s
fleet.
– Capacities: given the numbers of the capacities in the Models section, this para-
meter will expand on the average capacity of the airline’s fleet and comment on the
limitations of the cabin size.
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3.2 Justification of the Business Models Studied
After a initial examination of Volotea, it appears that it flies regular, short- to medium-haul
flights. For this reason, Charter Carriers and Long-Haul operators, such as FSCs and Long-
Haul LCC will be excluded from the comparison. This leaves four remaining carrier types from
the ones examined in the Literature Review: ordinary LCCs, LCC hybrids and the two defined
types of regionals - Feeders and Bounded Regionals.
Volotea has been previously defined as being an LCC [48]. This is why it is important to
verify or dismiss this characterisation by comparing it to the di↵erentiating features of a LCC.
This would include comparing it to what it is right now considered as a LCC hybrid.
However, the possible di↵erentiating value of Volotea may be in the scene of low-tra c
routes and their evolution. For this reason, it is important to take into account its possible
share in the Regional Carrier world, as ”regional” has been mostly linked to low passenger
demand. In this aspect, the LCC business model has gradually been shifting on to capturing
the same market niche as an FSC: the crowds. This has led LCCs to their full optimisation
of resources; in this process, though, the low-tra c market has been left unattended. In this
scene, Volotea may have emerged to cover the empty spot on the market that the rest of business
models have left behind while developing towards busier markets. For this reason, both the
Bounded Regional and the Feeder airline will be examined.
Within the Bounded Regional scene, there are some carriers that center their operations
primarily in an archipelago, as mentioned in the Literature. These will be discarded and
a Bounded Regional in the mainland will be chosen instead, as its area of operation would
be more similar to Volotea’s – which operates within a continental mainland area – and the
overall purpose is to ultimately determine whether or not Volotea can be classified into this
category.
3.3 Justification of the Airlines of Choice
Hereunder, it will be justified which airline is chosen to characterise each of the business models,
previously stated, that are going to be compared to the case of Volotea; as well as the criteria
followed to choose each airline.
A criterion that this study has tried to pursue is the selection of Spanish airlines. This is due
to the availability of air tra c statistics data in the AENA website - the Spanish public company
that manages airports of general interest in Spain and other countries. This constraint in data
availability means that some parameters may not be able to be studied outside the territory of
Spain. In the case of absence of data for needed analyses of routes outside of Spain, the data
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obtained for the Spanish territory may be able to be extrapolated, but this will be justified
individually for each specific given case. As a general rule, this will happen with the study of
the parameter of Airports Attended.
The airline chosen as exemplary of a LCC will be Wizz Air. This company has the largest
fleet of any Hungarian airline, although it is not a Flag Carrier, and is also the largest base at
Budapest Airport. The airline o↵ers a↵ordable flights to central and eastern European countries
[7]. Wizz Air flies with two airline codes: its main code W6 and its relatively new code W9
that operates exclusively from London Luton. This paper will be only looking at the flights
with the W6 airline code.
As it has some presence in the Spanish markets and the fact that it basically embodies the
theory behind what an LCC is, Wizz Air has been selected to be analysed and compared to
Volotea.
The example airline of a hybrid LCC will be Vueling. Although this airline has been defined
as a pure LCC along its history, after further study, the airline results to have gone through
multiple hybridsations over the years. However, it still contains most of its characteristics
similar to a LCC.
Vueling Airlines is a Spanish airline based in Barcelona. It is the biggest airline in Spain in
number of destinations and in size of its fleet [49]. Given its high presence in Spanish markets,
the availability of its data and the apparent similarities with Volotea in some aspects, this
airline has been chosen as the candidate to characterise a hybrid LCC for this study.
As the example of a Regional Feeder Carrier, Air Nostrum will be examined. This carrier is
also known as Regional Iberia as it mainly supports the FSC Iberia. Air Nostrum was founded
in 1994 in Valencia (Spain), aiming to become the reference regional airline in the south of
Europe. It operates low- to medium-density routes in niche markets in Spain and is present in
almost all its Autonomous Communities. Many of its routes are Public Service Obligation (OSP
in its Spanish acronym) or as feeder for Iberia at low-hours for high-density routes [12].
It therefore complies with both imposed criteria: it is a Feeder – the carrier type aimed to
analyse – and either or both origin and destinations of its routes are within Spanish territory,
so there will be full availability of all data for its study.
The Bounded Regional Carrier chosen is the Norwegian airline Widerøe. Widerøe describes
itself as the largest regional airline in Scandinavia. It mainly flies along the coastline on the
north and west of the Scandinavian peninsula, which are all indented with deep fjords up to the
Lofoten Islands, reaching beyond the Arctic Circle [10]. The airline mainly operates short-haul,
although it does operate international flights to nearby countries too.
Widerøe has been chosen as there are no airlines in Spain which strictly adjust to the
Bounded Regional business model, aside from Binter, which is centered around the Canary
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Islands – an archipelago, discarded due to the geographical di↵erence in operation to what
Volotea does. However, some of the statistics of Norway are also available and it has been





4.1 The Case of Volotea
In order to avoid the repetition of Volotea’s analysis when compared to the di↵erent carriers, a
first analysis of this airline will be conducted.
4.1.1 Attended Destinations
Target market
Volotea’s target market goes hand in hand with the fact that they operate low-density markets.
Carlos Mun˜oz, CEO of Volotea, states that the company tries to better connect mid-cities – cit-
ies with a significant population and interesting attractions to go visit – that have been avoided
by large Low-Costs in the long-term, as they have swifted focus towards big markets.
Mun˜oz also states they try to “fly where other people don’t fly”[48] – where other people
don’t fly directly. This is, Volotea targets those who would rather avoid stopovers or other
means of transports.
Again, according to Carlos Mun˜oz, Volotea actually focuses in “stimulat(ing) people to
travel, who would otherwise stay at home”[48]. This is, the company aims to attract the
attention of a niche of people who did not have the preconcieved idea of flying.
“Whether they fly for leisure, whether they fly for visiting friends and relatives or whether
they travel on business”; “whether they are technologically savvy [...] or not and still go to
the travel agent or they prefer to compare-shop in an OTA or are a small company and use
some type of corporate agency”. This is how Mun˜oz gives importance to Volotea’s distribution
strategy and emphasizes that the airline tries to reach every possible customer that wants to
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fly within the small-market it operates, and this is why Volotea does not just restrict itself to
internet distribution, but also counts on GDS and all possible distribution agencies. “We have
to reach absolutely everybody [...] to make sure they will find us”, he says [48].
Volotea’s Destinations
Figure 4.1 shows a map of the destinations operated by Volotea. The airline serves 20 domestic
destinations and 69 international destinations in 14 countries, as of February 2020.
Figure 4.1: Destinations operated by Volotea [4]
Two conclusions can be drawn from a first look at this map:
1. Volotea flies almost exclusively the south of Europe and most cities are right on the coastal
areas.
2. Volotea only operates the capital cities of 4 out of the 14 countries it flies to (namely,
Madrid, Prague, Vienna and Athens).
At first sight, these cities could be considered vacational destinations. However, as com-
mented in Section 4.1.1 the routes operated are those that have “interesting reasons to go
visit”.
Furthermore, Volotea’s development during the last years has seen a tendency to expand
to the north of Europe too.
Therefore, it is important not to fall a priori into the idea that Volotea is a vacational
carrier.
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Airports Operated
Again, when Volotea describes itself, it states that the company attempts to “connect small
and medium sized European cities with non-stop direct flights at very competitive prices” [4].
In order to verify this statement, data has been collected in Figure 4.2 that shows the airports
to and from which most of its passengers are flown in Spain.
Figure 4.2: Percentage of passengers flown by Volotea to airports of di↵erent sizes [5]
Out of the 34 airports studied to obtain Figure 4.2, Volotea flies 23, 16 of which are below
10M passengers.
The graph indeed shows that Volotea operates more than 85% of its flights to mid-sized
Spanish airports. These airports, to gain a general understanding, are cities such as Mallorca,
Malaga or Valencia.
Given these di↵erences, and verifying in Figure 4.1 that there are not many big airports
among Volotea’s destinations, it is safe to assume that this tendency would be reproduced in
other countries in which the airline also operates.
Given this analysis from Volotea’s target market, the destinations it operates and the





Limits of the network
The furthest away points of Volotea’s network are Gran Canaria to the South-West, Hanover
to the North and Rhodes to the East. From end-to-end, there is more than a 4000km dis-
tance.
Except for two destinations in the North of Africa (Tanger and Marrakech), all its destin-
ations are in Europe, mostly in the south of the continent.
A one-word description of the area covered by Volotea for comparison purposes, would
be continental, although it technically just operates a part of the continent.
4.1.3 Network Topology
Airport bases
Voltoea’s bases are seen in Table 4.1. It has a total of 14 bases.
VOLOTEA












Table 4.1: Volotea’s bases [11]
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A series of conclusions are drawn from Table 4.1:
1. Volotea has no hub – this is, it does not use an airport for connectivity purposes as an
FSC does with a H&S.
2. Volotea has more presence in France or Italy than it does in Spain – this is, it does not
base its operation in a region or specific territory and has more focus outside the frontiers
of the airline’s nationality. In fact, Nantes and Venice are its bases with the biggest
amount of route connections: 32.
3. Most of these cities are medium or big-sized cities, but not country capitals - this reflects
again that the airline flies small- to medium-sized cities and avoids big, crowded airports
that are already attended by larger airlines.
Degree Centrality
Volotea’s Degree Centrality is 0,32. This value indicates that, in the spectrum of network
connectivity between the Point-to-Point network – completely decentralised – and the Hub
and Spoke network – completely centralised –, Volotea would be closer to the decentralised
end.
Network Configuration
Figure 4.3 shows the full network of Volotea. The list of bases has been highlighted to show that
they act precisely as individual origin or destination points from which many routes depart. It
also stands out that all destinations are extensively connected and not many are a part of just
one route.
In any case, this depiction graphically shows that Volotea’s network is clearly Point-to-
Point and has no centralisation point for all destinations.
Having analysed these parameters, and taking into account that the company’s website




Figure 4.3: Volotea’s Network [6]
4.1.4 Attended Routes
Longest and shortest routes
Despite the fact that its network covers a territory of more than 4000km, Volotea does not reach
the four-hour-limit in its flights and does not reach the 3000km range. The shortest ranges are
are around 200km in length and most of them are from mainland Europe to islands in the
Mediterranean Sea. This data is framed in Table 4.2.
Route Distance Time
Lanzarote - Strasbourg 2832 km 4h
Santorini - Nantes 2527 km 3h 51min
Tenerife - Nantes 2491 km 3h 45min
Athens - Santorini 217 km 50h
Bari - Dubrovnik 203 km 55min
Athens - Mykonos 135 km 45min
Table 4.2: Volotea’s longest and shortest flights [6]
The fact that many bases are spread along an extended geography – not just a region –
enables the company to fly in a wide-spread area without having to use aircraft with longer
ranges to do so. In this case, as stated before, Volotea has bases extended all throughout the
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countries bathed by the Mediterranean, which enables it to be present along more than just the
2500km territory with medium-range aircraft (as will be seen in Section 4.1.6).
Distances flown
Figure 4.4 gathers which percentage of Volotea’s flights fly which distances.
Figure 4.4: Distances operated by Volotea’s flights [6]
The graph shows that more than 86% of Volotea’s flights cover distances shorter than
1500km. Specifically, 75% of its flights would be covering a distance between 500km and
1500km.
Although the average distances of all routes is of 1023km, it is important to account for its
distribution as the biggest concentration of flights, a 42% is actually found in lower distances –
between 500km and 1000km.
This leaves Volotea classified as attending medium-haul routes, although tending to the
lower limit.
4.1.5 Frequencies
Weekly and daily flights per route




Figure 4.5: Weekly frequencies from Volotea [6]
When it comes to the daily number of flights performed on a given route, 93% of routes
operated by Volotea are flown just once per day, as shown in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6: Daily frequencies from Volotea [6]
Seasonality
Only about 20% of the flights from Volotea are operated during the whole year. Another 35%
flies only around the Summer months (June, July, August and September) and another 40% flies
during the months of April, May, June, July, August, September and up to late October/early
November.
Other routes, essentially those to destinations with warm weather all-year-round, such as
the Canary Islands, only operate during the Winter months.
This last parameter analysis shows that Volotea flies low frequencies, both on a weekly-
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and daily-basis, and that the airline is highly seasonal, although it combines it with a reas-
onable number of flights going on all-year-round.
4.1.6 Fleet Characteristics
Models
Table 4.3 shows the aircraft models the airline owns. The fleet characteristics are not only
relevant to understand the present operations of the airline, but also to hint its plans for future
operations.
Aircraft In Service Ordered Avg. Age [years] Capacity [PAX] Range [km]
Boeing 717-200 14 — 17,1 125 3815
Airbus A319-100 19 4 15,9 150-156 6950
Totals 33 4
Averages 16,4 143 5620
Table 4.3: Volotea’s fleet [11]
At first glance, what attracts attention of this fleet is the di↵erence in aircraft models. One
would tend to think that for an airline with low ticket prices – as is Volotea – would prioritise
simplicity and commonality of the fleet, as happens with a LCC.
Although Volotea has just two aircraft types, they are from di↵erent aircraft manufacturers.
However, Carlos Mun˜oz stated that the airline would “definitely migrate entirely out of the 717
and entirely into the A319 in the next two or three years”[50].
This aircraft also has the particularity that, although it is shorter in length than other
members of the A320 family (the A320 and A321), it reaches further ranges – meaning new
further-away markets. Although A319s have a more limited capacity than its other family
members, it does increase by a 20% the capacity of Volotea’s existing fleet.
Taking into account that the average age for a commercial aircraft is around 11 years,
Volotea’s fleet can be considered rather old.
The fact that an airline aimed at smaller markets has airliners in its fleet is eye catching,





As seen in Table 4.3, Volotea’s fleet’s average range is 5620km. The Boeings 717 reduce the
average range, so in the case that the entire fleet shifted to A319s, this average range would go
up to 6950km. This range would be in the medium-range for a commercial jet aircraft.
This would also mean that Volotea has no long-term intention of flying much longer routes
than it already is.
Capacities
As seen again in Table 4.3, Volotea’s average capacity is of 143 passangers. This corresponds,
again, to a small capacity in a commercial airliner. And if the airline happens to homogenize
the fleet to all A319, it would also mean that it has no intention of transporting more people
per flight.
Volotea’s fleet will be therefore classified as heterogeneous as of February of 2020 and
composed by small-sized airliners, in terms of aircraft size.
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4.2 Volotea and LCCs
4.2.1 Attended Destinations
Target market
As described in Section 2.2.3 in the Literature Review, a LCC’s target customer is typically a
frequent traveler on a budget or a holiday traveler and this is reflected in Wizz Air’s custom-
ers.
Wizz Air’s statistics show that the average age of its passenger is 34 years old with a 51%
of the passengers being between ages 35 and 49. 47% would be College graduates. In terms of
reasons to travel, 60% would be visiting a new country or friends and relatives, 20% would be
self-financing businesses or entrepreneurs on work and nother 20% would be working abroad
and returning home [51].
Wizzair.com is also one of the world’s most visited airline websites, and 96% of their current
sales come through digital sales channels [52].
Wizz Air’s Destinations
Figure 4.7 shows that Wizz Air has presence in virtually every country in Europe. It also has
some destinations in the North of Africa, Middle East and West Asia. In total, it serves 144
international destinations in 44 countries, as of February 2020 [6].
Figure 4.7: Destinations operated by Wizz Air [7]
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The airline company has more presence in some countries than it does in others, but, a
priori, it looks like it flies all sort of destinations, independent of the airport size and loca-
tion.
Airports Operated
As there is only access to Spanish AENA Statistics, this study has been performed on the
airports that Wizz Air operates in Spain. Out of the 34 airports studied, it just flies to 11 of
them. Out of these 11 airports, 6 of them are classified as airports that host more than 10M
passengers a year.
Figure 4.8: Percentage of passengers flown by Wizz Air and Volotea to airports of di↵erent sizes
[5]
As seen in Figure 4.8 a 95% of the passengers it flies from and to Spain go through airports
that hold more than 2M passengers yearly. This is, medium- to big-sized airports. In particular,
a 65% of passengers are destined in airports that hold more than 30M passengers a year – this
is, Madrid and Barcelona.
The graph also shows an obvious di↵erence with respect to the airports that Volotea attends
the most.
Wizz Air can be then classified as an operator of big-sized airports.
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4.2.2 Attended Area
Limits of the network
As pointed out before, the airline has a presence all over the European Continent.
The network’s limits stand in Dubai to the South through to Tromso to the North, to
Reykjavik to the East and Nur-Sultan to the West. From its farthest-apart points, the extension
is of almost 7500km.
This extension is almost double than that of Volotea.
The extension of the network of Wizz Air can be considered as continental, although
it does reach some points outside Europe.
4.2.3 Network Topology
Airport bases
Table 4.4 shows the bases of Wizz Air and instead of having a classification in Table 4.4 for
“Bases (in) Spain” (as with Volotea), it will have a classification for bases in its country of
origin, which is Hungary.
The airline has a total of 26 bases, mostly and roughly scattered from north to south along
Eastern Europe. This number of bases makes sense as to the tra c that Wizz Air flies. Unlike
Volotea, many of these bases are capital cities or medium- to large-sized cities.
However, as seen in Section 4.1.3 for Volotea, Wizz Air has no hubs and just two of its bases
are in its home country. Actually, these two bases constitute the only two domestic destinations
of the airline. Wizz Air therefore has a bigger presence in countries abroad, as Volotea. Even
so, its largest base is kept in Hungary: Budapest Airport serves 68 destinations – the base that,






























Table 4.4: Wizz Air’s bases [7]
Degree Centrality
Table 4.5 shows both Wizz Air’s and Volotea’s Degree Centrality. As happens with Volotea,
the value for Wizz Air is closer to the Point-to-Point side of the spectrum of network types. As
it is higher than Volotea’s, it indicates a slightly higher centralisation of its operations.
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Table 4.5: Degree Centrality of WizzAir and Volotea
Network Configuration
Figure 4.9 shows the whole network from Wizz Air. In the same way Volotea is spread hori-
zontally along the South of Europe, Wizz Air is distributed vertically along the East of Europe,
having covered the area of its geographical predominance. Although it looks like the bases of
Wizz Air are more concentrated if taken into account the wider extent from West to East of its
network.
Figure 4.9: Wizz Air’s Network [6]
Wizz Air does not advertise stopover flights either and the parameters point out, again,




Longest and shortest routes
Table 4.6 shows the longest and shortest routes that Wizz Air flies.
The longest routes of the airline are little more than 4100km. These are almost double
in range as Volotea’s. Most of them either reach the Canary Islands or the Middle East from
Eastern Europe.
The shortest routes are also almost double in length to Volotea’s and are flights between
di↵erent countries.
Route Distance Time
Katowice - Dubai 4192 km 5h 45min
Tenerife - Bucharest 4183 km 5h 30min
Warsaw - Tenerife 4093 km 5h 35min
Budapest - Targu Mures 406 km 1h
Katowice - Lviv 356 km 1h
Gdansk - Malmo 349 km 1h
Table 4.6: Wizz Air’s longest and shortest flights [6]
Distances flown
Regarding the distances that Wizz Air flies, only 1% of its routes are shorter than 500km in
length. The length of the rest of flights are more or less equally spread, being around 20% the
flights between 500km and 100km; between 1500km and 2000km; and of more than 2000km
each. The remaining 40% of flights would be between 1000km and 1500km.
When compared to Volotea’s distribution, it is noticeable that Wizz Air operates longer-
haul routes, it having 77% in the medium- to long-end of the intervals and Volotea concentrating
its flights rather at the lower end. They do both, though, operate many flights in the 1000km
to 1500km range.
Wizz Air is therefore classified as attending rather medium-haul routes – although
tending to longer distances.
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Figure 4.10: Distances operated by Wizz Air’s flights compared to Volotea’s [6]
4.2.5 Frequencies
Weekly and daily flights per route
As seen in Figure 4.11, Wizz Air’s number of flights per week is low. Unlike Volotea, though,
that has a majority of weekly frequencies of one to two flights per week, Wizz Air’s routes are
flown up to that four times per week.
Figure 4.11: Weekly frequencies from Wizz Air compared to Volotea’s [6]
Regarding the daily number of flights for a given route, the tendency is pretty much the
same as Volotea. A 93% of its routes are also flown just once a day, as shown in Figure
4.12.
Seasonality
Wizz Air has less than a 10% of seasonal flights.
This is a big di↵erence with regards to Volotea’s highly-seasonal operations structure.
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Figure 4.12: Daily frequencies from Wizz Air compared to Volotea’s [6]
A conclusion for this parameter would be that Wizz Air flies medium-frequencies, with
low daily frequencies for one route and with year-round routes.
4.2.6 Fleet Characteristics
Models
Table 4.7 shows Wizz Air’s fleet’s basic specifications.
Aircraft In Service Ordered Avg. Age [years] Capacity [PAX] Range [km]
Airbus A320-200 69 — 7,9 180 6150
Airbus A320neo — 1 TBA 6300
Airbus A321-200 34 — 2,9 230 7400
Airbus A321neo 8 2 0,8 239 7400
Totals 111 3
Averages 5,9 200 6620
Table 4.7: Wizz Air’s fleet [11]
The average age of Wizz Air’s fleet can be considered young.
These aircraft are all from the same family – the A320 family, all narrow-body airliners
designed and produced by Airbus. This fits exactly to an LCC fleet strategy, as it lowers costs
of maintenance and operation significantly.
The “neo” versions are just the same aircraft but equipped with more environmentally-
friendly engines, which save 20% fuel burn per seat, as well as save payload and therefore
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extends range, lowers operating costs, noise and NOx emissions by 50
Volotea’s A319 would belong to this A320 family too, although it is a shorter version.
Ranges
The average range of 6620km corresponds to a short-to-medium haul range. Although the
airline has three (en route to four) aircraft types, there is not much of a di↵erence in ranges
between them. The 7400km-range airliners may be used to reach longer distances but there
is not much variation. In any case, Wizz Air’s fleet can, for the moment being, reach longer
distances than Volotea’s fleet.
Capacities
Capacity numbers show a bigger di↵erence to Volotea’s fleet capacity as Wizz Air transports
200 passengers per flight in average and Volotea, 143.
Hence, Wizz Air is composed by an homogeneous fleet of medium-sized airliners of
one same family and manufacturer.
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4.3 Volotea and Hybrid Carriers
4.3.1 Attended Destinations
Target Market
Vueling aims to cover the largest market share by addressing all ranges of age and social class.
They o↵er notably low prices, which mainly attract leisure travellers and visiting friends and
relatives-type travellers.
Apparently, the amount of business customers and families flying Vueling has increased
and the airline has designed specific fares for these customers. For this reason, the airline has
started to o↵er fares designed especially for these customer types. In particular, these fares
include agility and flexibility in reservation changes for business travellers; and comfort and
seats next to each other for families.
As well as selling tickets online, Vueling works with GDSs and agencies.
Vueling’s Destinations
The map in Figure 4.13 shows the destinations operated by Vueling. The airline serves 28
domestic destinations and 91 international destinations in 32 countries, as of February 2020
[6].
It looks like Vueling flies a variety of cities in each of the countries it flies to, including
their capital city.
Airports Operated
Figure 4.14 shows which size of airport Vueling flies the majority of its passengers to.
Out of the 34 airports studied, Vueling flies 30. 23 of them host less than 10M passengers
per year.
The results display that more than 90% of Vueling’s passengers move through airports in
Spain of more than 2M passengers. In fact, 50% of them are flown to/from big airports, and
specifically 48% pass through Barcelona, its hub.
Given that Spain is Vueling’s biggest market – where it operates the most airports and
has the most amount of bases – it is considered that this data is representative of the kind of
airports it operates abroad. Especially because the airports that it principally operates outside
of Spain are also big airports.
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Figure 4.13: Destinations operated by Vueling [8]
This is a di↵erence with Volotea as it carries its passengers to smaller mid-sized air-
ports.




Vueling’s attended destinations will be therefore considered as big-sized airports
within the framework of continental flights.
4.3.2 Attended Area
Limits of the network
Vueling mainly operates Southern and Western Europe, although it has some flights to big
cities in Northern and Eastern Europe as well as Iceland, the Middle East and Africa.
The airline’s most further-apart points of the network are Banjul to the South, Reykjavic
to the West and North and Moscow to the East. This covers more than 6500km in its maximum
extension from end to end.
Even though this geography is very similar to Volotea’s, many of its destinations also reach
outside (continental) Europe.
Vueling’s area of operation will be therefore considered as continental, even though it,




Table 4.8 shows the bases from Vueling. These are 17 in total plus one hub.
Vueling’s bases show some di↵erences to Volotea’s:
1. Vueling has a hub: this highlights the fact that Vueling operates a Hub and Spoke network.
In fact, the airline o↵ers flights with stopovers in Barcelona. This is one of the things
that makes Vueling a Hybrid, as this is a feature of FSCs. Comparing Vueling to Volotea
in this aspect, the di↵erence is also clear.
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VUELING
Hub Bases Spain Bases Abroad













Table 4.8: Vueling’s bases [11]
2. Bases from Vueling out of Spain are mainly capital cities. This just points out that, if
compared to Volotea, the airline is flying di↵erent-sized airports, at least out of Spain.
It also alligns with the results obtained in Section 4.3.1 – most of the operations from
Volotea take place in medium-sized airports whereas Vueling’s are in high-tra c airports
– this would include its Hub in Barcelona too.
3. Most of Vueling’s bases are in Spain. This does not necessarily describe a di↵erence in
business model, but just points out the fact that Vueling’s market is focused in Spain,
while Volotea’s is not.
4. Vueling has a similar number of bases to Volotea. Although Vueling flies a bigger volume





Table 4.9: Degree Centrality of Vueling compared to Volotea’s
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The result for the Degree Centrality in Table 4.9 shows a big distancing from the theoretical
LCC business model that Vueling supposedly followed in its origins. This value is really close to
1, which would mean a network that works similarly to a fully-integrated H&S network, unlike
Volotea.
Network Configuration
All in all, regarding the network type, Vueling is closer to the H&S type, especially when taking
a detailed look at the routes departing/arriving Barcelona in Figure 4.15.
Figure 4.15: Vueling’s routes from Barcelona [6]
Vueling has a third of its routes with one of its ends in Barcelona – 107 in total –, so
it is evident that the network is highly centralised in this point. In fact, the countries at the
52
4.3. VOLOTEA AND HYBRID CARRIERS
perimeter of Vueling’s network are just connected through their capital cities to Barcelona.
However, the network combines this with other Point-to-Point flights, mainly from its other
bases. Many of these flights – almost 30% – connect the cities within Spain and about 50%
connect Spain with destinations abroad.
Given these results, Vueling’s network is defined as Hub and Spoke network.
4.3.4 Attended Routes
Longest and shortest routes
Table 4.10 collects the airline’s longest and shortest routes.
The shortest routes are similar in length to Volotea’s and are within one country too. The
longest routes, though, are much longer than Volotea’s – these always have Barcelona in one of
its end points and are flown either to North Africa or the Middle East.
Route Distance Time
Barcelona - Banjul (Gambia) 3600 km 5h 10min
Barcelona - Dakar 3489 km 5h 15min
Barcelona - Tel Aviv 3082 km 4h 20min
Barcelona - Mallorca 203 km 55min
Valencia - Ibiza 172 km 50min
Ibiza - Alicante 169 km 50min
Table 4.10: Vueling’s longest and shortest flights [6]
Distances flown
Figure 4.16 shows the distances operated by Vueling’s flights.
The distribution is quite similar to that of Volotea. Vueling flies a high percentage of routes




Figure 4.16: Distances operated by Vueling’s flights compared to Volotea’s [6]
This leaves Vueling classified as attending medium-haul routes.
4.3.5 Frequencies
Weekly and daily flights per route
Figure 4.11 shows that Vueling operates almost half of its routes 5 to 7 days a week, while the
other half either between 1 and 2 days or 3 and 4 days a week. This is a big di↵erence with
Volotea, that operates most of its flights 1 to 2 times a week.
Figure 4.17: Weekly frequencies from Vueling compared to Volotea’s [6]
Figure 4.18 shows that the distribution of daily flights is fairly similar to Volotea’s, although
with a slightly bigger number of routes flying more than once per day.
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Figure 4.18: Daily frequencies from Vueling compared to Volotea’s [6]
Seasonality
The seasonality index is also really low for Vueling. Not even 10% of its routes are seasonal
and these just occure during the summer season. This is also a big di↵erence to Volotea.




Table 4.11 shows Vueling’s fleet.
Aircraft In service Ordered Avg. Age [years] Capacity [PAX] Range [km]
Airbus A319-100 6 — 13,2 144 6950
Airbus A320-200 79 1 8,7 180/186 6100
Airbus A320neo 23 2 1,2 186 6500
Airbus A321-200 15 — 4 220 5600
Totals 123 3
Averages 6,9 188 6155
Table 4.11: Vueling’s fleet [11]
The airline has a relatively young fleet with 6,9 years in average, with very new A320neos.
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Again, as occured with Wizz Air, Vueling has just aircraft of one manufacturer and one fam-
ily: the A320s in di↵erent sizes. One of them, the A319 actually coincides with Volotea’s.
Ranges
Vueling’s fleet has an average range of 6155km and again, the variation in ranges is not too
big. This range does not di↵er too much to Volotea’s – both have short to medium range
aircrafts.
Capacities
Vueling can also transport up to 45 people more in average per flight, 188 passengers, when
compared to Volotea.
Vueling’s fleet is therefore homogeneous and consists of medium-sized aircraft of one
same family and manufacturer.
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4.4 Volotea and Regional Feeders
4.4.1 Attended Destinations
Target Market
Air Nostrum’s customers are Iberia’s customers, as the majority of flights that the airline
operates are purchased through Iberia’s website – although Air Nostrum sells out tickets from
its own website too. These customers want to fly from a small- or mid-city to Madrid or to
some other place with a stopover in Madrid.
Air Nostrum’s magazine is very regional-oriented and stands out the particularities of
its destinations, such as local parties or so on, to stimulate the interest of travel to these
places.
Air Nostrum’s Destinations
Figure 4.19 shows the destinations that Air Nostrum operates. The airline serves 26 domestic
destinations and 16 international destinations in 7 countries, as of February 2020 [6].
Figure 4.19: Network operated by Air Nostrum [9]
Except for Algiers and Madrid, the airline flies no other capital city and limits its operation




Figure 4.20 shows the passenger to airport size statistics from both Air Nostrum and Volotea.
Figure 4.20: Percentage of passengers flown by Air Nostrum and Volotea to airports of di↵erent
sizes [5]
Out of the 34 airports studied, Air nostrum flies 31, 25 of which host less than 10M
passengers per year. This is, 80% of its routes are flown to small or medium-sized airports.
However, a 40% of its passengers go through big airports that host more than 30M passen-
gers per year. This 40% actually represents almost exclusively the amount of passengers that
Air Nostrum flies to or from Madrid, Iberia’s hub. The rest of pasengers are flown in similar
numbers to all other airport sizes.
This is also a big di↵erence with regard to Volotea, who only flies 7% of its passengers
through airports such as Madrid or Barcelona.
Air Nostrum’s attended destinations will be therefore considered as medium- to big-
sized airports.
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4.4.2 Attended Area
Limits of the network
In the majority of the cases, the destinations flown by Air Nostrum are domestic, but there is
also one destination in Germany plus others in neighbour countries in North Africa, France and
Italy.
The end points of Air Nostrum’s network would be Tenerife to the south and west, Frank-
furt to the north and Bologna to the east. The biggest linear distance between its farthest-apart
points is more than 3000km.
This area is smaller to Volotea’s – as Air Nostrum still needs to reach the Canary Islands,
its area is similar to Volotea’s when compared from South to North, although Volotea’s area
extends more to the West when compared in width.
The area covered by Air Nostrum can be described as regional, as it just its national
frontiers plus some additional destinations nearby.
4.4.3 Network Topology
Airport bases
Air Nostrum’s bases are found in Table 4.12.
Hub Bases Spain Bases Abroad
Madrid Valencia –
Table 4.12: Air Nostrum’s bases [12]
There are a few comments to make regarding these results:
1. Given that this regional type is a Feeder and works within the H&S network of a FSC –
Iberia – it is expected that Air Nostrum has a hub – Iberia’s Hub.
2. Given that the Feeder already has a hub, and as a small carrier, it is unusual that it
has another base in a di↵erent airport than that where its hub lies on. However, its




3. It is not unusual that the airline has no bases abroad, given that it is still a regional and
it just operates mainly in the country region.
Given this description of the bases of Air Nostrum, there are many di↵erences with those
of Volotea. To start o↵, Volotea does not have a hub. It also has many more bases in general
and the majority of them are outside of Spain.
Degree Centrality




Table 4.13: Degree Centrality of Air Nostrum compared to Volotea’s
Air Nostrum has a value above 0,5 which means that its network rather resembles a Hub
and Spoke system.
This makes sense because, as described in the Literature Research, the Feeder connects
regional airports to a hub as part of the H&S network of another FSC company. However, as
Air Nostrum also flies some Point-to-Point routes that connect regional cities between them,
that is why the degree centrality value may not be that close to 1.
Network Configuration
50% of Air Nostrum’s routes have an end point in Madrid. Out of these, 50% are domestic
flights – the remaining 50% are the whole of Air Nostrum’s international routes (25% of its
total routes), as they only depart from the hub, Madrid.
While most destinations from its network have just 1 or 2 connections, Madrid is connected
to 29 cities, just followed by Valencia, connected to 10.
Again, although Air Nostrum is a Regional Carrier, its subclassification into a Feeder is
very defining of its operations – which take the form of a H&S network as seen in Figure
4.19.
Yet again, Volotea has been defined as operating Point-to-Point with a very di↵erent net-
work concept.
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Air Nostrum’s network mostly resembles a Hub and Spoke.
4.4.4 Attended Routes
Longest and shortest routes
Table 4.14 shows the longest and shortest routes that Air Nostrum operates.
Route Distance Duration
Tenerife - Valencia 1900 km 2h 55min
Tenerife - Santiago de Compostela 1740 km 2h 45min
Madrid - Frankfurt 1423 km 2h 40min
Bilbao - Santiago 141 km 50min
Ibiza - Alicante 169 km 50min
Ibiza - Mallorca 141 km 50min
Mallorca - Menorca 119 km 45min
Table 4.14: Air Nostrum’s longest and shortest flights [6]
The shortest routes for this case are very short – joining two islands from the same ar-
chipelago. Regarding the longest routes, they are domestic flights to or from the Canary Islands.
These are domestic flights but are still in the African continent, so they are quite long for a
Regional Carrier.
If the routes to the Canaries were not taken into account, the longest routes would be those
parting from Madrid to some other place in Europe – all below 1500km in length.
Regarding the shortest routes, they are either interinsular or between nearby regions. In
any case, within the same country and of similar length to Volotea’s shortest routes.
Actually, an 85% of routes are flown between Spanish regions and the rest connecting
Madrid to some other destination.
Distances flown
Figure 4.21 shows that most of the routes flown by Air Nostrum, namely a 52%, are less than
500km away, while 42% of Volotea’s routes are between 500km and 1000 km away. All of its
routes longer than 1500km are within Spanish territory as, again, the Canary Islands are also
part of the “regional” geography.
61
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Figure 4.21: Distances operated by Air Nostrum’s flights [6]
It can therefore be concluded that Air Nostrum flies short-haul routes.
4.4.5 Frequencies
Weekly and daily flights per route
Figure 4.11 shows that almost 80% of Air Nostrum’s routes are flown from 5 to 7 times a week.
This is a big di↵erence to Volotea, who mainly flies frequencies of 1 to 2 flights weekly.
Figure 4.22: Weekly frequencies from Air Nostrum compared to Volotea’s [6]
In terms of the daily frequencies, Figure 4.23 shows that Air Nostrum’s percentages are
more widely distributed as the airline does 40% of its routes once a day, 23% twice a day and
37% three or more times a day. This is also a big di↵erence to Volotea who almost exclusively
flies all its routes just once a day.
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Figure 4.23: Daily frequencies from Air Nostrum compared to Volotea’s [6]
Seasonality
In the case of Air Nostrum, 20% of its flights where seasonal in 2019, of which some were
operated in December and January and others during the Summer months.




Air Nostrum operates a fleet of short-range small jets and turboprops of short range as seen in
Table 4.15.
Aircraft In service Ordered Avg. Age [years] Capacity [PAX] Range [km]
ATR-72-600 11 — 7,2 72 1528
B. CRJ-200 7 — 20,7 50 3045
B. CRJ-900 6 — 13,5 90 2956
B. CRJ-1000 27 — 5 100 2491
Totals 42 —
Averages 8,6 86 2414
Table 4.15: Air Nostrum’s fleet [11]
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B. stands for Bombardier in all the CRJ Series presented.
The average age of the whole fleet is young – 8,6 years – although the Bombardier CRJ-200,
is quite old with 20,7 years old
As the fleet includes an ATR model as well as the CRJ aircraft, the fleet can be considered
heterogeneous.
This fleet is very di↵erent to Volotea’s, whose fleet is composed by airliners, not regional
aircraft.
Ranges
The range of these aircraft is for short-haul flights, ranging from 1528km to 3045km, with an
average of 2414km between all its models.
Although the ATR makes the fleet heterogeneous, it may be more fitting for the shorter
routes as it has a range of 1528km. In general, there is more variety in ranges in this fleet than
in the other airlines studied.
This average range is less than half than that of Volotea’s (5620 km).
Capacities
The fleet capacities are also in the lower-range. The average number of seats of the aircraft,
being 50 the minimum and 100 the maximum, is 86 passengers.
Volotea has more than double this average – up to 143 passengers. This is, Volotea can host
more passengers in one flight – a figure closer to what a LCC could carry than a regional.
Air Nostrum’s fleet is therefore to be considered heterogeneous and consists of regional
aircraft.
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4.5 Volotea and Bounded Regionals
4.5.1 Attended Destinations
Target market
Widerøe is a local carrier that operates between smaller towns and cities in Norway and provides
flights to the Lofoten Islands and the far north.
Due to Norway’s geography, air service is of great importance for smaller communities of
Norway’s West and North, connected by winding roads, if any.
So, in general, Widerøe targets an average Norwegian who needs to make a displacement
within the country, even for a short distance, as alternatives are scarce in many cases.
Widerøe’s Destinations
Widerøe’s network operates 41 domestic destinations and 9 international destinations in 4
neighbour countries with a total of 244 routes [6].
The airports Widerøe operates are widespread within the whole of Norway. From its
international destinations, only Copenhaghen is a capital city. It flies to London too, but to
London Southend, one of its secondary airports.
Airports Operated
As there is no flight statistics data of the Norwegian market online and the airline does not fly
to Spain, there is no available data to perform this study for Widerøe.
However, taking a look at the airports that the airline operates in its domestic market,
just one of them can be considered a medium-sized airport, with 28,6M passengers per year
(it does not reach 30M, the lower-end of the interval for the so-called “big airports” in the
study performed for the rest of the airlines). The rest of Norwegian airports carry under 6,5M
passengers a year. Therefore, it is safe to assume that Widerøe mainly operates small- to
medium-sized airports.
In this case, the biggest percentage of passengers would be flown to airports up to 10M




Figure 4.24: Widerøe’s Network [10]
Wideroe’s attended airports are small- to medium-sized.
4.5.2 Attended Area
Limits of the network
Widerøe’s attended geography is clearly di↵erent to the rest of the airlines examined. It is
just centered in Norway and its neighbour countries at the northern part of Europe in Sweden,
Denmark, Germany and UK.
The airline’s network ends in Munich to the south, Liverpool to the west, Vardø to the east
and Mehamn to the north. In total, around 2500km of network from its farthest-apart points.
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This is the airline that covers the smallest area.
The area covered by Widerøe is therefore almost exclusively national to its country, so
it will be defined as regional for the comparison purposes.
4.5.3 Network Topology
Airport bases
Table 4.16 shows Widerøe’s bases – 5 in total.
WIDERØE






Table 4.16: Widerøe’s bases [11]
The bases are also spread along the geography of the country. The airline has no hub and
all its bases are within Norway. The bases are more connected in terms of number of routes
when compared to the rest of airports, although none of them particularly stands out. For this
parameter, a di↵erence to Volotea’s base distribution would be that Widerøe has all its bases
in just one country.
As a side comment, its international flights are flown from southern airports, namely
Sandefjord, Kristiansand, Oslo, Stavanger and Bergen, some of which are not bases.
Degree Centrality
Results from degree centrality of Widerøe are found in Table 4.17.
Widerøe’s degree centrality value – 0,39 – is closer to a fully-integrated Point-to-Point
network. This is something expected, as Widerøe has been chosen as representative of the






Table 4.17: Degree Centrality of Wideroe compared to Volotea’s
Volotea has a very similar degree centrality, which makes these two airlines similar in this
aspect.
Network Configuration
Figure 4.24 depicts the network as clearly Point-to-Point. There is no identifiable unique base
or hub. Most destinations are in fact connected to an average of 4 other destinations, so, in spite
of being Point-to-Point with a few number of bases, its destinations are quite interconnected
and harnessed.
Volotea also flies Point-to-Point and its destinations are also very interconnected and har-
nessed with a big focus of routes in its bases.
Wideroe’s network can therefore be defined as Point-to-Point.
4.5.4 Attended Routes
Longest and shortest routes
The distance values in Table 4.18 are all much smaller than those seen for all other airlines. Dis-
tances in both Widerøe’s longest and shortest routes are definitely much shorter than Volotea’s,
reaching even less than half their size.
The longest route (in distance) is international - to Munich, while all others remain within
Norway. The shortest routes are also within Norway and are particularly short.
It is particular to Widerøe that all of its routes are connected to the country - they are
either domestic routes (a 95%) or connect the country with either one of the named international
destinations. None are flown within or bewteen other nationalities.
68
4.5. VOLOTEA AND BOUNDED REGIONALS
Route Distance Duration
Munich - Bergen 1394 km 2h 20min
Oslo (Torp) - Tromsø 1235 km 2h 25min
Tromsø - Bergen 1220 km 2h 25min
Berlev˚ag - Mehamn 46 km 18min
Vadsø - Kirkenes 39 km 15min
B˚atsfjord - Berlevag 32 km 18min
Table 4.18: Wideroe’s longest and shortest flights [6]
Distances flown
Figure 4.25 shows that Widerøe operates mainly routes that are less than 500km away, just
as the Feeder. These represent an 80% of its routes, while only 16% of its routes are between
500km and 1000km away and 4% between 1000 and 1500. The airline has no flights over
1500km.
This is, again, a big di↵erence to Volotea, whose routes are mainly in the 500km to 1500km
interval.
Figure 4.25: Distances operated by Widerøe’s flights [6]





Figure 4.26 shows that 80% of Air Nostrum’s routes are flown 5 to 7 times a week. This is a
big di↵erence to Volotea, who mainly has a frequency of 1 to 2 flights weekly.
Figure 4.26: Weekly frequencies from Widerøe compared to Volotea’s [6]
The distribution of the percentage of routes that are flown daily by Widerøe is similar to
Volotea’s as shown in Figure 4.6, with most of its routes (a 60%) being flown once a day and
the rest evenly distributed between twice or three or more times a day.
Figure 4.27: Daily frequencies from Widerøe compared to Volotea’s [6]
Seasonality
The proportion of seasonal routes for Widerøe is really similar to the Feeder – 20% of the total
routes are seasonal: 10% in the Winter months and 10% in the Summer months.
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Widerøe flies high frequencies and its non-seasonal routes.
4.5.6 Fleet Characteristics
Models
Just as with the Feeder, Table 4.19, shows that Bounded Regionals also fly turboprop-powered
regional aircraft. This is, again, really di↵erent to Volotea’s fleet in so that these are aircraft
that are specific to fly regional.
Aircraft In service Ordered Avg. Age [years] Capacity [PAX] Range [km]
DHC-8-100 25 — 22 39 2084
DHC-8-300 6 — 23,9 50 1711
DHC Dash 8-400 10 — 22,3 78 2040
Embraer 190-E2 3 — 2 114 5280
Totals 44 —
Averages 21 54 2241
Table 4.19: Widerøe’s fleet [11]
All DHC correspond to De Havilland Canada.
Regarding the fleet’s age, Widerøe’s fleet is formed by quite old aircraft. The fleet is also
quite heterogeneous as, although 41 of its 44 aircraft are DHC, the airline has three Embraer,
which are the youngest in age.
Ranges
Just as in the case of the Feeder, Widerøe shows greater varieties in the ranges that its fleet
can fly, meaning it does more diverse routes.
The Embraer is not just the newest in the fleet, but it also brings a big di↵erence in terms
of range, as it can reach more than double the distance than all other aircraft in the fleet.





Capacities are also low with 54 passengers on average– they are able to carry less than half
the passengers than Volotea does in one flight. However, again, the Embraer, can not only fly
longer distances but also carry many more passengers, almost as many as a small airliner.




5.1 Summary of Results
Table 5.1 collects the conclusions obtained from the analysis of the parameters defined in Section
3 for the selected airlines.
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Table 5.1: Summary of results
Out of the six parameters studied, there a three that have a result for Volotea that does not
coincide with any of the other airlines: the attended destinations, the fleet and the frequency
of Volotea. However, before jumping into conclusions, let’s examine the outcomes for each
parameter individually:
– Attended Destinations: Volotea is the only airline that flies strictly mid-sized airports
(an 86% of its flights).
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Others fly a variation of airports sizes – it is the case Vueling and Air Nostrum, with a
particularly high percentage of passengers being flown to big airports. In the case of Wizz
Air, it clearly flies 85% of its passengers in Spain to big-sized airports. Although there is
no data from Widerøe, it is assumed that most of its passengers will be flown to small or
mid-sized airports too.
– Network Topology: Volotea flies Point-to-Point. As do Wizz Air and Widerøe, while
Vueling and Air Nostrum are considered to follow a H&S network.
In these Point-to-Point systems, all destinations are very interconnected by their bases –
there is not just one random destination from one of the bases to a particular destination.
This would be, however, subject of further study.
It is therefore important to acknowledge that Volotea does not have a unique hub, as
do Air Nostrum and Vueling, as the computation of the Degree Centrality and the Hub-
distribution network show.
– Attended Area: Volotea’s network extends (potentially) throughout the European con-
tinent. Although right now it is mainly centered in the Mediterranean basin, it does shows
signs of extending further North.
This is also the case of Vueling and Wizz Air. Vueling actually covers a similar geo-
graphy to Volotea, while Wizz Air is massively extended and concentrates its operations
in Eastern Europe.
Vueling is also especially centered in connecting Spain – mainly with neighbour countries
and also to cities that are more far-o↵ through Barcelona. This is very di↵erent from
Volotea, who does not center its operations around a unique country.
There is therefore no specific geography that Volotea covers that makes it di↵erent from
other Business Models.
Linked to the fact that it covers mid-sized cities, it is important to stand out that this
target market does not restrain exclusively to a given region – as happens with Air Nos-
trum and Widerøe – but soughts to attend this specific niche (mid-cities / regions) in all
markets/internationally (in terms of geography).
– Attended Routes: Both Volotea and Vueling fly medium-haul routes in average. Wizz
Air flies medium-haul too but with a tendency to fly rather longer routes while Air
Nostrum and Widerøe fly much shorter routes.
Volotea and Vueling’s coincidence here may be linked to the fact that they cover really
similar geographies and markets. This parameter alone cannot be used to di↵erentiate
Volotea from a Hybrid as Vueling, although it is a clear di↵erentiation from the Regionals
and from LCCs, which, in general terms, fly di↵erent route lengths. This can also be
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seen in the comparison of the longest and shortest flights (not just the average distances),
which indicate other objectives when operating flights.
– Fleet Charachteristics: Volotea flies airliners as do the LCC and the Hybrid Carrier,
which is a big di↵erence to the Regionals, which fly turboprops.
Wizz Air does not have A319 in its fleet but has many airliners of this family in bigger
sizes. Vueling, on the other hand, also flies A319s, but does not exclusively use these –
meaning, the airline aims at di↵erent-ranged and capacity routes. Carlos Mun˜oz stated
that Volotea wanted to run exclusively on A319s.
In general terms, this small airliner di↵erentiates Volotea both from LCCs and Hybrids
and the Regionals. Vueling may be using these to fly its longer but less-demanded routes,
as it actually tends to mostly operate bigger markets; while it is an undesirable aircraft
for Regionals as, although they transport less passengers, they do not require such long
ranges. It may therefore be a key point in Volotea’s plan to operate smaller markets, that
require transporting less amount of passengers to a variety of ranges.
– Frequencies: This parameter also shows a clear di↵erence in how Volotea operates: it
flies really low frequencies. The low amount weekly flights stand out when compared to
all other airlines and the closest it gets to is Wizz Air which, on average, flies 44% of its
flights 1 to 2 times per week, while Volotea does so in the 66% of flights.
Regarding daily number of flights, its distributions are closer to a LCC or Hybrid which
mainly fly their routes just once per day; while it totally di↵ers from the Bounded Re-
gional, which flies mostly more than three times per day per route and the Feeder, which
has a much more widespread distribution.
This parameter can actually be directly linked with the fleet of choice. Volotea flies many
routes at low frequencies and aims carry as many people as possible in one leg – all this
taking into account that they fly mid-sized cities and that they may not be able to fill-up
a bigger airliner. This also means that not that many aircraft are needed considering
most routes are just flown once a week.
5.2 Can Volotea’s business model be considered a new
business model?
Given the previous conclusions, the answer to whether Volotea is following a new business model
is yes.
With this answer, it is necessary to give this new business model a name. Current strategies
75
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION
have their name based in di↵erent criteria: Legacy Carriers in reference to their length of service;
others can also be named after the topology of their network – it is the case of the Network
Carriers referrencing to their operation of H&S networks. Furthermore, when talking about
Low-Costs, the reference is focused on its costs; and when it comes to Regionals, its name
comes from the geographical area they cover in their operations. This di↵erence in the origin
of the names of current carriers makes it especially tricky to find out a name for a new business
model.
It makes sense to make use of the scientific field, particularly the field of business models,
to achieve the needed flexibility to overcome this issue. This area of study holds descriptions
of current models and allows for the sourcing of publications and research papers in other
sectors and industries. Therefore, this powerful tool can be used to look at other industries
to find similar business models that describe the new model that the present thesis sougths to
describe.
In the business model level, Volotea could be named as a Long Tail Model. The key to
this model is found in the publishing sector:
“The long tail is a business strategy that allows companies to realize significant profits by
selling low volumes of hard-to-find items to many customers, instead of only selling large volumes
of a reduced number of popular items. The term was first coined in 2004 by Chris Anderson,
who argued that products in low demand or with low sales volume can collectively make up
market share that rivals or exceeds the relatively few current bestsellers and blockbusters but
only if the store or distribution channel is large enough.” [53]
Digital publishing has actually enabled the editing of fewer titles in a timely manner and
selling on the internet has enabled publishers specialised in these titles to o↵er many titles so
that the total amount of sales is enough.
This translates to the present case in the following way: Volotea is interested in looking
for routes that, because of their lower tra c, are of less interest to airlines that follow di↵erent
models. With smaller aircraft and lower frequencies, though, these routes can be flown. The
business is sustained with a significant amount of routes to achieve economies of scope – which
would be a coincidence with Regionals, but not regarding the area covered.
Therefore, Volotea would be following a Long Tail business model in aviation.
5.3 Prospects
By having limited this thesis to the parametrization of Volotea’s business models, there are
many subjects of study that remain open after its conclusion.
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The present thesis could admit extensions, such as the identification of other airlines that
could potentially also be following this business model in di↵erent geographies or even in the
same one, which would lead to study if they could coexist in the same market in the same way
there is competition between LCCs.
Volotea itself could also be the center of further study, and fill in gaps of the present
one, to further describe the Long Tail business model in aviation. Some parameters that have
been left aside are the belonging of the airlines to alliances, additional revenue sources, aircraft
utilisation...
The parameters that where studied in this paper could also be looked into in more depth,
such as the seasonality, the route operation of Volotea with other competitors and the minimum
number of passengers the airline needs to keep a route open.
New research possibilities in this line could include a tool to verify whether the business
model would work in a given market or to estimate the true potential of routes with low but
enough foreseeable tra c. Questions as whether this business model will be sustainable in the
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